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AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS AND
INTERMEDIATION IN NIGERIA
BY
George

Ohoie and Uche J. (Iwaleke'

sustainable system

of

financial

development and intermediation for
economic activities to thrive.

t

I

=a

'E
q.

.=_

Financial sector reform can

be

deflned as a set of policy measures
designed to transform the financial
system and its structures with a view
to achieving a deregulated market-

=qiiF

oriented system within an appropriate
regulatory framework. lt is also the

introduction of market-based

procedures for monetary control, the

'}
George

promotion of competition in the
financial sector, and the relaxation of

Okoie

restrictions on capital flows
(Waqabaca, 2000).

INTRODUCTION

Financial systems all over the world

play very important roles in the
development and growth of the
economy. However, the effectiveness
and efficiency of the system as well as
its scope and capacity varies quite
considerably among economies. This
is partly because of the varied levels of

,Jeveiopment. More developed
iinancial systems tend to be

Financial intermediation facilitates the

savings and investment process
through the mobilization of savings
from the surplus units to investment
by the deficit units. Van Wijnbergen
(1990) notes that interest rate, among
others, is a major policy instrument
with the most influence on savings.
According to him, private portfolio
choice/ allocation is also a function of

associated with the more developed
economies. However, a sufficiently
- qorous understanding of the
Jrnergence, development, and
economrc rmplications of Cifferent

interest rate. Financial services
therefore encourage savings if they
raise the net returns by raising the
rnterest rate on savings. Higher real
tnterest rates in turn are ttkely to lead

tS absent

Levrne. 1997).
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to be effective when it is able to
contribute to or raise the level of
investment needed to achieve growth
in the economy (Ndekwu,1998).
Nigeria's financial system rn common

with those of many

developing

economies, particularly African
economies, has for the greater part of
the country's history been severely

repressed. For most of the period
1960,
intermediatlon was ineffective, as
rnterest rates were held at very low

since independence in

levels, following excessive

governmerrt interference with the
system. ln 1.987 , the authorities
commenceo extensrve reform of the
financial systenr as part of a Structural

,{djustmerrt F)rogramme (SAP).
Peforms involved liberalizrng rnterest

and exchange rates. promoting a
market-based system oi creoit

assets.

aitocation, enhanong competition and

rhe

efficiency rn the tinancial system and

aorlit,r r.lf the financial system to

rnocitize savrngs arrd hence
rnti'rbuie Lc ,nvesi,'l'r€nt and

?coooi'rtre .ircwih,tepe:rcs or tne
iuairtv oi i:nanc;ai services. ancl ihe
eitectiveness and efiicrency of the
financral system. Srfice one objective
rf ihe financrai system (apart from the

and scope and reduced ccmpertion.

operation of the payments

Forthese countries, the aim should be
to develop, over time, an efficient and

mechanism) rs to mobilize finance for
investment, the system can be juciged

'Mr Okorrc,

Uche

strengtheninq the regulatory

tramework. Since the SAP reforms,
tl're iIranctdr sector has experienced

of i'eforms. The
iirrporlance of financial sector reforms
rn Nigeria derrves from the fact that the

vJ:rous phases

[cundation for economic growth is
fragrie, particularly vuinerable to a
drop rn oil prices.

This paper focuses on the impact of
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various financial sector reforms on
financial intermediation in Nigeria. ln
other words, it focuses on the effects
of various policies on the sector's

ability

to

effectively perform its

financial intermediation role. One way
to evaluate the financial sector reform
is to make a comparison between preand post- reform performances of the
financial sector using appropriate
financial ratios. An alternative is to
make a cross-section comparison
with countries in the same (analytical)

rates at below market-clearing levels.

Liberalizing the financial sector
however, causes real interest rates to
rise, thus generating more domestic
savings and investment.

According to the World Development

Report (1989), a financial system
provides services that are essential in

A major impediment to the efficient

stable and widely accepted medium
of exchange reduces the cost of

functioning of the financial system is

transactions, facilitates trade and

exchange and, therefore,

questions are raised:

assets with attractive yield, liquidity,
and risk characteristics encourage
financial savings. By evaluating

to what extent has financial
in

alternative investments and

financial intermediaries increase the

to what extent has the
measures to improve the

a

capital markets led to increased
resource flows to the markets?
to what extent has measures to
improve the banking system led

a

to the promotion of

banking

habits?

The remainder of the paper is
organized into five sections as
follows: Section 2 undertakes a broad
review of literature on the subject.

Section 3 surveys Nigeria's

experience with financial repression,
liberalization and reforms, while

Section 4 reviews the post-

liberalization/reform performance of
the Nigerian financial sector. Section

5

summarizes, provides policy

recommendations and concludes the
paper.

2.0

specialization in production. Financial

financial deepening, scope and
quality of intermediation?

sector reforms resulted

monitoring the activities of borrowers,
efficiency of resource use.

Financial systems aid economic
groMh by augmenting the liquidity

needed for long-term investments.
Liquidity risk arises due to the
uncertainties associated with
converting assets into a medium of
e xc h a n g e. lnf o rm at io n a
asymmetries and transaction costs
may inhibit liquidity and intensify
liquidi$ risk. Based on these frictions,
the emergence of financial markets
and institutions to augment liquidity
becomes necessary. The link
between liquidity and economic
development arises because some
I

high-return projects require a long-run
commitment of capital, but savers do
not wish to part with their savings for
long periods. Thus, the financial
system moves in to augment the

liquidity needed for long-term
investments, thereby helping to avert

the reduction in investments

that

THEORETICALAND

would have occurred in the high return

LITERATURE REVIEW

projects (Mckinnon, 1973,

The theoretical link between financial

sector reforms and intermediation is
found in the financial liberalization
theory of McKinnon (1973)and Shaw

(1973). The McKinnon-Shaw
hypothesis postulates that

government control and intervention

in the financial system, limits the
operation of market mechanisms,
leads to financial repression, and
slowe economtc growth and
developmer;t. Under financia,
repression investment is repressed
by a shortage of savrngs, which
results from acimrnlstered real interest

liquid and illiquid investments, banks
provide high levels of insurance to
savers against liquidity risk while
simultaneously facilitating long-run
investments in high return projects.

a modern economy. The use of a

group as Nigeria. Whichever way is
adopted, the following pertinent
0

more productive technologies. By
accepting demand deposits and
choosing an appropriate mixture of

Shaw,

1973). Hicks (1969) contend that the
financial system, which played the
role of mitigating liquidity risk, was

behind the inciustrial revolution

in

England.

asymmetric information, a situation in
which one party to a financial contract
has much less accurate information
than the other party. For example, a
borrower who takes a loan usually
has much better information about the
potential returns and risk associated
with the investment projects the loan
will finance than the lender does.
Mishkin (1997) identifies two basic
problems associated with asymmetric
information. These are (a) adverse
selection and (b) moral hazard.

Adverse selection is an asymmetric
information problem that occurs
before the transaction. This exists
when the parties who are most likely

to

produce the most undesirable
(adverse) outcome are the most likely
to be selected for a loan. Borrowers
who want to engage in big risks are
likely to be the most eager to take out
a loan because they know that they
are unlikely to pay it back. Since
adverse selection makes it more likely
that loans might be made to bad credit
risks, lenders may decide not to make
any loans, even though there are
good credit risks in the market place.

Moral hazard

is an

asymmetric

information problem that occurs after
the transaction. The lender is
subjected to the hazard that the
borrower has incentives to engage in

activities that are undesirable

(immoral) from the lender's point of
view because they make it less likely
that the loan will be paid back. Moral
hazard occurs because the borrower
has incentives to invest in high-risk

and sometimes in unprofitable

Agenor and Montiel (1996) express
the view that financial intermediaries
rncrease the average productivity of
capital (thus the growth rate) in two
ways: (a) L'y collectrng, processing,

anC evaluating the relevant
informaticn on alternative investrnent

projects; and (b) by

projects in which the lender bears

most of the loss if the project fails. The

of interest between the
borrower and the lender stemming
from moral nazard (the agency
problem) impries that many lende:s
will decioe that they would ratner not
conflict

entrepreneurs. through their risk

make loans, sc that lending and
investment activitl, will be at lora,

sharing iunction, to rnvest in riskier but

levels

2A

rnductng
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Moral hazard can also occur if high
enforcement costs make it too costly
for the lender to prevent moral hazard
even when the lender is fully informed

about the borrower's activities.

lnformation acquisition costs create

the incentive for financial
intermediaries

to emerge

(Diamond
1984). The existence of financial
intermediaries, economizes on
information acquisition costs, hence,

facilitating the acquisition of
information about investment
opportunities and thereby improves

resource allocation. Also, financial
intermediaries can set-up special
arrangements and contracts, such as

the collateralization of credit, to
generate the correct incentives
(Gross, 2001)

Product (GNP). The positive
association between the rate of
savings, investment and growth is
usually explained in terms of a causal
link running from the former to the
later. However, higher groMh might
drive savings up, leading in turn to
higher investment.

to Agenor and Montiel
996), the term'financial repression'
is due to analysts who take their lead
from McKinnon (1973) and Shaw
(1973). According to these authors,
(1

the financial system in

many
developing countries is'repressed'
(kept small) by a series of government

interventions that have the effect of

keeping very low (and often at
negative levels) interest rates that
domestic banks offer to savers. To a
large extent, the motivation for this

type of interventions is fiscal; the
government wants to actively
promote development but lacks the

savings. According to Levine (1997),

direct fiscal means to do so, because

mobilization involves the of either a lack of political will or
agglomeration of capital from administrative constraints.
disparate savers for investment.
Mobilizing the savings of many By keeping interest rates low through
disparate savers may be costly as it the imposition of ceilings on lending
involves (a) overcoming the rates, it creates an excess demand for
transaction costs associated with
collecting savings from different
individuals and (b) overcoming the

credit. lt then requires the banking
system to set aside a fixed fraction of

associated with making savers feel
comfortable in relinquishing control of
their savings. Financial systems that

economic efficiency and

savings of individuals can profoundly

implies that even

are more effective at pooling the

affect economic development.
Besides the direct effect of better
savings mobilization on capital
accumulation, better savings
mobilization can improve resource
allocation and boost technological
innovation.

Shortage of savings is likely to be a

limiting factor for investment. An
increase in national savings has a
substantial effect on the level of
investment, as investment must be
suppoded by saving and domestic
firms compete for the flow of available
domestic saving. Asamoah (2008)
notes that the extent to which financial

sector reform are successful

in

domestic informal credit market or

financial intermediation through

external financial markets which can

lead

to capital flight

(Agenor and

Montiel,1996).

According

As noted earlier, one major role of
financial intermediaries which
influences growth in a positive
direction is the mobilization of

informational asymmetries

informal markets, and foreign assets.
ln all, financial repression tends to
induce disintermediation, which can
take the form of the emergence of a

the credit available to priority sectors.
This system has implications both for

for the
distribution of income. The
combination of low rates of return on
assets and high reserve requirements

a

competitive

banking system will be forced to offer
low interest rates on deposit liabilities:

because this

is the only way to

achieve an adequate spread.

ln many developing countries, the
combination of low nominal deposit
rates and moderate to high inflation
rates has resulted in highly negative
rates of return on domestic financial
assets, with an adverse effect on

According to Roe and Sowa (1997),
the objectives of financial sector

reform which includes the
liberalization of interest ratas are

linked to the view that more and better
financial intermediation is a critica!
factor in the productive system of an
economy. ln other words, financial
sector reform gives rise to better
intermediation.

Oloyede (1998), writing about the
Nigerian financial system, is of the
view that the main objec{ives of
financial sector reform are to: (a)
improve mobilization of domestic

savings (private and public) by
implementing measures to develop
money and capita! markets; (b)
improve the level and stncture of
interest rates through reduction of

interest rate subsidies and bad debtor
through liberalization of interest rates

and the introduction of prime rate or
base lending rate system.

A wave of liberalization of financial
markets swept over much of the
developing wodd, beginning in the
mid-1980s when these countries
embarked on the reform of trcir
financial systems. This liberalization
has been characterized by greater
scope being granted to market fiorces
in determining interest rates and in
allocating credit. Although this has
occurred under the pressure of
increased globalization of financial
markets, and following the example of
many industrial countries, there has
been an expectation that financial
I i

beralization would aid intermediation

investment projects.

and consequently impact economic
growth. ln particular, the early
literature on financial liberalization
stressed the potential role of higher
interest rates in mobilizing savings
that could be put to productive use.

The portfolio effects of interest rates

are of the opinion however,

induced to switch from the acquisition

financial liberalization may actually not
increase private saving. According to
them, the effect of interest rates on
saving is ambiguous, as the income
effect might offset substitution efiecb.

savings and the financial

intermediation process. This in turn
has provided the wrong 'target'rate of

return against which

to

judge

Bandiera, Caprio and Honohan (1999)

promoting saving, investment and
growth depend on the interest rate
elasticity. The real rate of interest

ceilings encourage financial
disintermediation, as savers are

exerts a positive influence on the ratio
of savings to the Gross National

of claims on the banking system to
accumulation of real assets traded in

2t

that

}

-
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Based on the econometric results of
their study, they advised that it is at
best unwise to rely on an increase in
savings as the channelthrough which

of financial systems, no excessive

first sight a complex one comprising

inflation and sub-standard loans are
created. lt is imperative that proper
regulatory structures and a healthy

as at end-December 2008, 24 deposit

be

economic climate are already in place
before liberalization is carried out.

It is important to note at this juncture,

lkhide and Alawode (2001) discovers
that the implementation of financial

financial liberalization can
expected to increase groMh.

that ending repression

and

introducing reform is not a smooth
prooess. There are many aspects of
the initial conditions in a reforming
eoonomy that are likely to influence
the prospects of success of financial

reform. Roe and Sowa (1997)
identifies two of these conditions as

being of pre-eminent importance.
These are: the portfolio quality of the
domestic banking system; and the
size of the fiscal deficit. According to
them, it is impossible to expect banks
to make the correct responses to
policy instruments, including interest
rates associated with market-based
methods of monetary control, when
these banks, are insolvent or nearly
so. Also, it may be unrealistic to
expect governments with very large
fiscal deficits to surrender the easy
sources of implicittaxation associated

with tightly controlled

sector reforms in Nigeria has been
drsappointing as bank insolvency,
high inflation and excessively high
interest rates have become common
phenomena in the economy. Their
study identified wrong sequencing
process as a major factor in the poor
performance of financial sector
reforms.
To measure the provision of financial

services, most studies such as
(Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1997 and

Okorie, 2000) identifies liquid
liabilities as a ratio of GDP (Broad
Money divided by GDP) and Private
Credit as a ratio of GDP (Credit to the
Private Sector divided by GDP) as key
indicators of financial intermediary

development. Liquid liabilities as a
ratio of GDP is a typical measure of

financial
systems, or to make the very large
fiscal adjustments that would enable
them to balance their books without
having to depend on these easy

financial depth and thus of the overall
size of the financial sector. Liquid
liabilities, however, does not consider

sources of revenue and borrowing.

equals the value of credits by financial
intermediaries to the private sector
divided by GDP rs more than a simple
measure of financial sector size.
While private credit does not directly

Liberalization no doubt, is essentialto
the growth of an economy. However,
there exists a mixed feeling as to the
actual role of liberalization. While it is
believed that liberalization will give
interest rates an upward push which

will stimulate private savings and
investment, the high lending rates
which liberalization is likely to also
induce, increases cost of production

and consequently reduce

the

utilization of savings (Fajana, 1990).

the allocation of capital; it is just an
indicator of size. Private Credit which

the amelioration of
information and transaction costs,
higher levels of Private Credit is
measure

interpreted as indicating higher levels
of financial services and therefore
greater financial intermediation. One
of the expected gains of financial
sector reform is the development of a
financial system that would improve
banking habits and by extension the

of the payments
recent study such as
Onwioduokit, 2006, identifies

Ang and McKibbin (2005) note that
despite the fact that financial
liberalization enlarged the financial

development

system in Malaysia, it does not appear
to be effective in promoting long term

Currency Outside Banks as a ratro of
Broad Money as a useful indicator in
measu ri ng financial sector efficiency.

growth. Financial liberalization is
unlikely to result in higher economic
growth without an efficient and well-

functioning financial system. To
accelerate growth, the financial
system must be properly shaped
before under taking any liberalization
program. Policy makers must ensure
that while encouraging the expansion

system.

3.0

A

NIGER!A'S EXPERIENCE

WITH FINANCIAL
REGULATION,

LIBERALIZATION AND
REFORMS

The Nigerian financial system is at
,,)

money banks (DMBs), 5 discount
houses (DHs), 5 development

finance institutions (DFls), 73
insurance companies, several
insurance brokers, 25 pension fund
administrators, 1 stock exchange, 1

commodity exchange, 840

microfinance banks (MFBs), 99
primary mortgage institutions (PMls),

several stock brokers, 113 finance
companies (FCs) and 1,264 bureauxde-change (BDC). The Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) conducts monetary
policy and together with the Nigeria

Deposit lnsurance Corporation

(NDIC), supervises banks and since
1 991 , certain other f inancial

institutions. Capital market
rnstitutions include the Securities and
Exchange Commisslon (SEC) which
also directly supervises the Stock

Exchanges. National lnsurance

Commission (NAICOM) has
oversight functions over the
insurance sub-sector, while the
National Pension Commission
(PENCOM) is the sole regulatory
agency with oversight functions on

pension funds management in
Nigeria under the contributory

pension scheme that came into effect
in 2005 as stipulated in the Pension
Reform Act of 2004 (CBN Annual
Report 2008). The Debt [Vanagement
Office (DMO) also exists to manage

Nigeria's domestic and external

debts.

3.1

Pre-Structural Adjustment
Programme (period before
1986)

ln spite of the seeming complexity of
the Nigerian financial system, its role
in the mobilization and allocation of

resources has been rather limited
especially prior to the reform
measures in 1986. Before this period,
the financial system had come under
severe government regulation. This

control stems from government
pursuit of monetary and

macroeconomic policies, aimed at'

promoting price stability; reducing
pressures on the external sector;
stabilizing the exchange rate; and
stimulating employment and
economicgroMh.
To achieve these objectives, it relied
on direct methods of monetary control

Contnr Brnk of Nigcrte
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The control of interest rates was
aimed at maintaining a stable long
term nominal interest rates, while
directed credit was aimed at

such as': administrative control on
most deposit and lending rates;
directed credits to particular sectors
such as agriculture; preferential

April - June 2010
were achieved to some reasonable
extent, the resultant effects of these

policies were evidenced in less
incentive to mobilize savings; due to

interest rates to same sectors;
significant controls on new entry into

were believed to be of

deposits prior

banking; and significant shareholding
by government in some major banks.

growth. Although these objectives

to 1986. As seen in Figure 1, for a
substantial part of the period under
review, interest rates have thrived

promoting growth of key sectors that
prime
importance in overall economic

Figure I
Treasury Bill, Savings Deposit and Maximum Lending Rates

low nominal interest rates on savings
to 1986. Likewise,
lending rates stayed at low levels prior

outside the market system.

Reflecting the effects of past
restrictive measures, real deposit
rates have been highly unstable as
nominal rates were slowly raised,
while inflation fluctuated widely
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upwards (see Figure 2).
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allocation decisions were made by
government. Consequently, the role of
the Nigerian financial system became
relatively insignificant for effective
mobilization and efficient allocation of
financial resources, prior to 1986
(Oloyede 1998).

Figure 2
These policy changes on interest rates
adversely affected financial savings
as a proportion of GDP (see Figure 3).

lnflation Rates and Real Deposit lnterest Rates

The control of interest rates in 1991
and 1994 through 1996 saw financial
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rising after the banking consolidation
exercise that ended in December

2005. Again, the different policy
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of the gross instability that has
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Figure 3

3.1.1 Post-Structural Adjustment
Programme (1987 -2003)
The Nigerian financial system prior to

the introduction of the

Total Savrngs/GOP Ratio

World

Bank/lMF-supported Structural

Adjustment Programme (SAP)in 1986
had been impeded in its pivotal role of
savings mobilization and allocation by
an environment where market forces

025
t0 20
n

&

15

p 10

had not been permitted to

005
000

. - ..lt -+" si"

C €- $' *Jo *S .$ ."* e' ..f ".l| *-f ot' .tst ",+- r$ ,$

fully

determine prices. Liberalization which
commenced in 1987 was therefore,
prompted by the growing realization

that controls had become less

+Savrngs/GDP

effective over time. Government

Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statrstical Bulletin, 50"' Anniversary Edition, 2008
'Roe (1998), made similar observations in respect of the Egtptian Banking system

23

recognized that the prolonged use of
interest rate ceilings and directed
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credit programs would lead to low

financial sector however, the number

in operation increased
signif icantly to 12A by 1992,
of

savings with the financial system and
inefficient use of resources which
overall would hinder the development
of a better financial system. The
reform measures adopted in 1986/87
were therefore, expected to improve

banks

the mobilization of financial resources
by broadening and deepening the
financial system. ln other words, the
reforms were directed at attaining
allocative efficiency in the economy.

Accordingly, various reform

an enhanced

service

delivery. The NSE recently concluded

comprising of 66 commercial banks

arrangements with Thomson
Reuters and Bloomberg for

and 54 merchant banks.

dissemination

of

real-time market

data to the global investment

Not only did the number of banks and
products offered increase during the
period, 1986-1992, there was also a
change in the ownership structure,
with foreign ownership limited to only
a few banks. The rest were wholly
owned by Nigerians. The rapid growth
in the number of local banks could be
attributed to severalfactors. First, the

the conduct of monetary policy and

achieving

community. This service is designed

to compliment that provided by its
official Website and local Data
Centre. The Nigerian Stock
Exchange is working with Bloomberg
co-brand all its newly-created
indices, i.e., NSE-30 and the 4 sector
indices. This will further enhance the
profile of these indices and thereby
give institutions the confidence to
create products based on them,
knowing that they will be displayed to
a global investor base. Ongoing
reforms of the Capital Market by the

to

measures implemented in 1987 were
designed to liberalize the financial
system so that market forces would
provide appropriate signals for
savings and investments while
encouraging financial innovation and
technological development. The
measures introduced entailed the
dismantling of controls aimed at
creating an enabling environment for
the growth and development of
financial institutions, markets and

inefficiencies of the government
owned banks provided opportunities
for new entrants to target corporate

instruments, through competition and

licensing requirements including

financial

minimum paid-up capital, were rather

which saw banking sector stocks

instruments thus ensuring an optimal

liberal, resulting

allocation of resources for economic

reduction in the barriers to entry.

constituting about 72 per cent of the
daily traded stocks, and 22 of the 25
capitalized banks listed on the stock
exchange. For example, Market
Capitalization (MC) rose by 308.20
per cent, from N2.52 trillion at endDecember 2005 to N10.30 trillion at
end-December 2007, while the All-

appropriate pricing

of

and high income urban customers.
Another reason for the proliferation of

banks could be traced

growth and development. Some
component parts of the financial
sector reform introduced in 1987,
included: constraints on the public
sector's access to credit in order to
ensure that the private sector

the

in a

significant

3.1.2 Capita! Market Reforms

Equities
Following the deregulation of the
Nigerian capital market in 1993, the
Federal Government in 1995
liberalized the market, with the
abrogation of laws that constrained
foreign participation in the market.
Consequent upon the abrogation of

receives an adequate share of credit;

freeing interest rates from rigid
controls which had resulted in
negative real rates of interest, and
allowing them to be market
determined; granting the central

the Exchange ControlAct of 1962 and
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Decree of 1989, foreigners began to
participate in the market both as
operators and investors.Also, limits to

bank some autonomy in the conduct
of monetary policy by freeing it from
the control of the Federal Ministry of
Finance and allowing it to report
directly to the President; the licensing
of new (commercial and merchant)
banks, both local and foreign owned;
and relinquishing stakes in banks
previously dominated by government.

the percentage of foreign holding in
any company registered in the
country were removed. ln anticipation
of this development, the Nigerian
Stock Exchange (NSE) had since
June 2, 1987, linked up with the

As part of the reform programme, the
process of establishing banks was

Reuters Electronic Contributor

System for online global
dissemination of stock market

liberalised, which led to the setting up

of private indigenous banks in large
numbers. Prior to 1986, Nigeria had
only 40 banks made up cf 28

information with a view to engender
foreign interest in the day to day
activities of tne stock exchange. ln
November, 1996, the Exchange
launcheC its internet system

commercial and 12 merchant banks
with the former accounting for 60 per
cent of total banking assets and the

latter accounting for the rest.
Following the liberalisation of the

to

opportunities provided to banks bythe
liberalisation of the foreign exchange
market in 1986, with the introduction
of the second-tier foreign exchange
market (SFEM). A third reason was
that, between 1986 and 1991, the

(CAPN

I

ET) as one of

the

infrastructural support for meeting the
challenges of internationalization and
24

SEC have provided a new code of
Corporate Governance for quoted
companies.

Despite these reforms, the stock
market witnessed its major boom

during the banking sector
consolidation exercise in 200412005

Share lndex (ASl) rose by 140.77 per

cent f rom 24,085.80 at endDecember 2005 to 57,990.20 at endDecember 2007. The boom was,
however, truncated in April 2008,
when major market indices began to
record substantial declines, following
the global financial and economic
crises (see Figure 4).

Bonds
One of the major changes that have
taken place in the Nigerian financial

system was on the domestic debt
front which includes the resuscitation
of the government bond market after
several years of inactivity. ln a bid to
restructure the Federal Government
of Nigeria's deficit funding from
shorter to longer tenured borrowing
instruments, improve and lengthen
the yield curve in domestic money
markets and encourage long-term
savings, the Federal Government
resumed bond issuance in 2003, with
a N150 billion issue. The creation of
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Figure 4

sector liberalisation of the mid-1980s,
nevertheless, many of the new banks

appeared not interested

in
intermediating funds from depositors
to borrowers but rather made quick

Nigerian Stock Exchange ASI and MC,end - Dec lg85-end0ec 2009
70,000 00

't2 00

60,000.00

'r0 00

50,000 00

profits from exploiting arbitrage

opportunities in the foreign exchange
market.

800

40,000.

600

30,000.00

Although the macroeconomic
environment improved with the
restoration of civil democratic
government in 1999, the Nigerian

4.00

20,000 00
10,000 00

200

000

000

1985 1987 1989 '1991 1993 1995 't997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

IAll-Share

lndex

+Market

the Debt Management Office (DMO)
in 2000 actually prepared the way for
government to return to the bond

financial system was still
characterised by high level of

2009

Capitalisatton

aggregate amount of N2.36 trillion
issued, N4.47 trillion was subscribed,

while N2.45 trillion was

fragmentation and low level of
financial intermediation. There was
also a high volume of non-performing
loans. These problems militating
against the maintenance of banking
soundness and financial sector

market.

allotted
(DMO). While the bond market has

Major reforms witnessed in the bond

recorded reasonable growth in recent
times, the groMh has however, been
inhibited by such factors including

of the

characterized

and minimise bank failures,

volatile macroeconomic environment,

following measures among others,
were taken: introduction of the
prudential guidelines; enactment of

market included the development,
since 2005, of a frameworJ</calendar

for a regular and continuous issuance

of bonds and implementation of

a

regular (monthly/quarterly) issuance
programme. The DMO has also
established a Monetary-Fiscal Policy
Coordinating Committee to articulate
and resolve possible conflicts in the
implementation of domestic debt
management policies and strategies

poor macroeconomic environment
by high inflation and
unstable interest rates. Under a

both individual and institutional
investors develop a preference for
assets with shorter maturities such as

bank deposits and government

treasury bills thus starving the bond
market of funds (Chioke 2010\.

on the one hand, and monetary policy
and strategies on the other. ln addition

to the

establishment

of a

Primary

Dealers' Market Makers System
(PDMMS) to ensure a strong and
vibrant bond market, there is a
platform the Bond Steering
Committee - for regular interaction
with key stakeholders, including
market players. Currently, there are

21 Primary Dealer Market Makers
comprising of 16 DMBs and 5
Discount Houses. The debt
management focus is on deepening
the domestic debt market through the
use of derivative instruments as well
as the introduction of foreign currency
denominated FGN bonds in the
domestic market to support the pricing
of long-term instruments and to
access the cheapest available funds

in the market; and widening

and

deepening the scope of the financiai
and capital markets in line with
Financial System Strategy 2020, as
well as for purposes of sovereig;r
rating.

Asummary of FGN bonds issued from
2005 2009, shows that out of the

3.1.2

Post-

L i be ra I i s
Challenges

ati

on

The explosion in the number of banks
resulted in the dearth of experienced

staff as well as managerial capacity.
This was not helped by the equally
enormous pressure on the CBN and
NDIC which overstretched their
supervisory capacity. The weak
supervisory capacity, the inadequacy
of prudential. regulation and the
contravention of banking laws without

serious sanctions, consequently
allowed undercapitalised and poorly

managed banks

to

operate un-

checked, which contributed

significantly to the financial fragility,
banking

that later afflicted the
industry.

The fragility of the oanking system
clearly worsened durrng the 1990s
following the imprudent lending
practices, which constituted a major
cause of the cjistress. Although, the
contribution of the financial sector to
GDP increaseci after the ftnancial
25

stability called for immediate attention

regulatory/supervisory

authorities (CBN, 2009).
ln a bid to sanitise the banking industry

the

the Banks and Other Financial

lnstitutions Act (BOFIA) and the CBN
Act, 1991; introduction of new capital
adequacy requirements based on risk-

weighted assets, periodic review of
minimum capital requirements;
financial assistance, facilities and
regulatory forbearance to ban(s; and
contingency planning framework
against banking systemic distress.

3.1.3 Bank Recapitalisation and
Consolidation, 2004 2009
The CBN, on July 4, 2004, announced
a comprehensive reform programme,

at creating strong
financial institutions that would take
advantage of the benefits of size to
champion economic development of
the country. Priorto 2004, the Nigerian
banking sector comprised 89 banks,
which aimed

many of which were characterised by:
low or eroded capital base; large
number of small banks with relatively
few branches; poor rating of a number
of banks; weak corporate governance;
insolvency as evidenced by negative
capital adequacy ratros and capital
that had been significantly eroded by
losses; overdependence on public
sector funds and rncome from foreign
exchange tradrng; neglect of small and
medrum scale savers; lack of capacity
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to

support the real sector

of

the

economy; gross insider abuses that
resulted in huge non-performing
credits; and oligopolistic structure of
the banking system as the flrst 10
banks accounted for more than 70 per

cent of total deposits and assets
(cBN,200e).

Key elements of the reform among
others, included: increase in the
minimum capitalisation for banks from
N2.0 billion to N25 billion, with endDecember 2005 as deadline for full

compliance; phased withdrawal of

public sector funds from

banks,
starting from July 2004; consolidation

of banking institutions through
mergers and acquisitions; adoption of
a risk focused and rule-based

regulatory framework; adoption of
zero tolerance for non-compliance in
the regulatory framework; the
automation of the process for
rendition of returns by banks and
other financial institutions through the

electronic Financial Analysis and
Surveillance System (e-FASS); strict
enforcement of the contingency
planning framework for systemic
banking distress; revision and

updating of relevant laws, and the
drafting of new ones relating to the
effective operations of the banking
system and closer collaboration with
the Economic and Financial Crimes

Commission (EFCC) in the

establishment of the Financial
lntelligence Unit (FlU), and the
enforcement of the anti-money
launderrng and other economrc
crimes.

The maJor outcomes ot

the

3.1.5 Special Audit of Nigerian
Banks and Next Steps (2009
Date)

As a result of the recent

global
financial and economic crises which

adversely affected the Nigerian

in particular the capital
market and oil and gas sectors, it was
observed by the CBN that some
economy,

Nigerian banks had huge

of exposure to these
two sectors, in addition to general
weakness- in risk management
concentration

practices, poor corporate governance
practices and signs of illiquidity. lt
therefore became compelling to

ascertain the true financial health of
banks in the public interest.

to ensure a

sound financial

system in the country, the Governor of
the CBN in 2009 ordered the Special
Examination of all the 24 banks
operating in Nigeria. Following this
exercise, the CBN discovered that
some banks were exhibiting imminent
signs of collapse, which could put the
entire banking sectorand the Nigerian
economy in grave danger. Eight main

interdependent factors led to the
of an extremely fragile
financial system that was tipped into

creation

crisis by the global financial crisis and

recession (Sanusi 2010). These
included: macro economic instability
caused by large and sudden capital
outflows; major failures rn corporate
governance at banks; lack of investor
and consumer protection ; inadeguate
drsclosure and transparency about
the financial position of banks: criticai

consolioation exercise were:
emergence of 25 well capitalized

gaps in regulatory frameworks and

banks; tne trquidity engendered by the
inflow of funds into the banks brought
about a significant fall rn rnterest rates,
sustarned increase in bank lending to

governance and management

the real sector from 2005, through
2008; the consequent high single
tbiigor lrmrt. enhanceci banks'
Lapacrty to frr,ance large value
ti-ansactions, niore Nrgerian nanks
nad better access to credrt from
toreign banks, the caprtal rnarret
deepened and there was increased
awareness among the populatron; the
ownership structure of Nigerian banks
changed for the better and depositor

confidence improved owing to the
"safety in bigness" perception by
depositors (CBN, 2009).

regulations; uneven supervisron and
rce m e nt; u n s t ru c L u re i

enfo

process at the CBN and weaKnesses

in the ouslness envrronment in

the

country.

The result of the Special Examinatron
of the first set of 1 0 Danks announced
on 14th August 2C09 revealed that 5
'io save
Danks were rn grave danger.
the 5 banks frorn imminenr collapse.
the CBN had to rnject N420 billion lnro

them es !er-2 capital, while
simultaneously replacing thelr
management with interim ones.

After a review of the findings of the
Special Examination report in respect
of the remaining 14 banks, 8 banks

26

growth, while 2 banks were adjudged
to have insufficient capital but not in
grave situation and did not have
corporate governance issues. The
remaining 4 banks werefound to be in
a critical situation. Consequently, the
CBN injected another N200 billion to
support these banks, making a total of
N620 billion rescue package for the
ailing banks in the banking system.
The Bank also guaranteed foreign

loans to Nigerian banks as well as

provided guarantee for inter-bank
placement from July 2009 to March,
2010 in the first instance with an
extension to Decembe

ln furtherance of the CBN's statutory

duty

were found to have adequate capital
and liquidity to support the level of
their current operations and future

r,

2010.

While replacing the CEOs of troubled
banks, the CBN in a bid to strengthen
corporate governance in banks,

limited the tenure

of

managing

directors to a maximum of ten years.
CBN's oro-active intervention was
designed to strengthen the affected

banks, restore public confidence

rn

the banking sector, protect

depositors' money and save the
country from an avoidable financial
crisis. With the strengthening of the
affected institutions and other reforms
being undertaken by the CBN, the
Nigerian canking sector became
more stable, safer and stronger.

The formarron of the Asset
Management Corporation of Nigerra
(AMCON) is expected to racilitate an

improvement

in

canking secror

liquidrty. protection of the earnings of
banks from furiher erosron an0
reduction of the deot overhang on the
caprtal marKet and its Dartrcipants.

-liis should

provrde a n'ucr:-neeoeo

irnpetus for the revival of the Nigerian

CaoltalMarxet.

The conclusion cf the l,;arrx aucrt
exercrse, i:rought lo an eno the frrst
ihase of the orocess nr restorno

,l

I

Ili
rE

t,

,n

financiai sector staoililv s.nce 2C09 ra
Ongornq action tc.rcuses tn o,jitorn? ti
-apaoty wrrhin tne regurai.ci".v reqinte, I
ii
fast-tracking the irnorementatron .,f il
risk-based, consolidateo ano cross
border supervtsory frameworks.
easrng the flow of crecjrt, partrcularly

to the real sector of the economy;
improving governance structures and

practices in the financiai services
sector; and improving confidence in
the economy in general. The second
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of the banking reforms
included: enhancing the quality of
banks; establishing financial stability;
enabling healthy financial sector
evolution; and ensuring that the
financial sector contributes to the real
economy (Sanusi, 2010). Also, the
CBN has intensified efforts through
the Financial Services Regulation
Coordinating Committee (FSRCC) to
foster closer collaboration and
harmonization of its policies with
those of other regulatory agencies,
such as SEC, NAICOtV. and
PENCOIV, for better supervlsory
phase

impact.

4.0

ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL
SECTOR, PERFORMANCE,
PRE. Af.I D POST- REFORMS

A compaiative analysis of

financial
sector performi:nce pre and post SAP

and post 0anking consolidation
requires an appraisal of various
indicators of financial market
development. There is no perfect set
indicators that measures the
development of the financial sector for

of

effective intermediation. However,
indicators such as M2 as a ratio of
GDP, Credit to the Private Sector as a
ratio of GDP, Currency Outside Banks

as a ratio of M2, DMBs Assets as a
ratio of GDP and Quasi lr/oney as a
ratio of GDP have been adopted in
measuring the depth, size, efficiency
and intermediation role of the financial

system (CBN Annual Report, 2007;
2008).

SAP period to 15.97 per cent in the
post SAP period, before rising to 23.15

per cent in the post

banking

consolidation period. The outcome of
these major indicators measuring the

size and capacity of the financial
system to finance the economy
indicated that financial liberalization
introduced during the SAP period did

not impact significantly on the
economy. However, banking
consolidation improved the banking

As revealecj in the following analysis
(see tahrle-'1) the Nigerian financial
sector perforirred better in the post
bankrng consoiidation period than in
the post SAP litleralrzation period. For

instance, the depth of the financial
sector, as measured by the ratio of

broa(l ,noney supply (M2) to GDP
whrch on average stood at 26.69 per

system's capacity

to

finance the

economy. Financial efficiency

measured by currency outside banks
as a ratio of broad money supply (M2),
increased from 25.02 per cent in the
pre SAP period 1o26.40 percent in the

post SAP period and

thereafter,

improved to 13.93 per cent in the post
banking consolidation period. The
development reflected partly the

cent in the pre SAP period declined to
23.93 per cent in the post SAP period.
It however, rose to 28.47 per cent in
the post banking consolidation period.

impact of the increased use of
electronic and other forms of

Bank financing

card products (CBN Annual Report,

of the economy

measured by the ratio of credit to the
private sector to GDP improved
slightly from 14.28 per cent in the pre

Table 1: Period Average Performance of Financial
Development Indicators
Pre- SAP Reforms
(1970 - 1986)

Post- SAP Reforms
(1

987 - 2003)

Post- Banking
Consolidation Reforms
(2004 - 2009)

M2 as a Ratio of GDP
Credit to the Private Sector as
a Ratio of GDP
Currency Outside Banks as a
Ratio of M2
DMBS Assets as a Ratio of

26 69

23.93

28.47

14.28

15 97

23.'t5

25 02

26.40

13.93

GDP

46.46

32 83

47.00

Quasi Money as a Ratio of M2

43 84

41.49

43.86

2007).

Banking sector size in relation to the
economy decreased significantly in
the post SAP period compared with
the pre SAP period. The ratio of DMBs
assets to GDP declined from 46.46 per
cent in the pre SAP period to 32.83 per
cent in the post SAP period. However,
following banking consolidation that
commenced in 2004, it rose to 47.00
per cent. Quasi money as a ratio of M2
declined slightly from 43.84 per cent in
the pre SAP period to 41.49 per cent in
the post SAP period before rising to
43.86 per cent after the banking
consolidation exercise. This reflected

the outcome of the

aggressive

competition fordeposits by DMBs post
banking consolidation.

Cornputed from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletrn, 50 Years Special
Anniversary Edrtion, 2008

Figure

payments, particularly ATM and other

When compared with other emerging
African markets in the same group as
Nigeria, the Nigerian financial system
cannot be regarded as substantially
deepened. While some progress

5

Liquid Liabilities as a Ratio of GDP

seemed to have been made in
financial market development in

18
16
14
12

Nigeria, the overall performance of the
Nigerian financial system still falls

1

short of expectations. As Figure

08
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Financial Structure Dataset, 2008, the World BankiDECRG-FI
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2008

5,

illustrates, liquid liabilities (a measure
of depth and size of the financial
sector) as a percentage of GDP, was
higher in South Africa, Algeria, Egypt
and Mauritius than in Nigeria, from
1995 to 2008.
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lnterestingly, the situation is similar
with respect to credit to the private

sector (measure of financial
development) as a percentage of

informal banking sector and
inadequate settlement system.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND

GDP, in which Nigeria exceeded only

Algeria in the period under review
(see Figure 6).

The purpose of this paper was to
analyze the impact of various fi nancial

The foregoing results,

though
unsatisfactory is" however, not
surprising, as the Nigerian financial
system, has for many years, been
repressed by government actions in
its pursuit of other economic
objectives. By no doubt, the distress
in the banking sector which started in

1990 and still lingering till date, may

have eroded depositor confidence in

the sector, with

adverse

consequences for financial depth and
credit. lnterestingly, as we mentioned

earlier, some of the government
controlled banks, actually set the
stage for the banking crisis, which is
indicative of the adverse effects of
financial sector regulation.

4.1

RECOTIi'ENDATIONS

Key lssues and Ghallenges

Major challenges currently facing the

financial system include: market
imperfection with the money market
characterized by few players, leading
to an absence of competition; overreliance of the banking industry on

public sector deposits; inadequate
skilled manpower; lack of breadth,
depth and sophistication of
instruments; and inadequate
infrastructure and lnformation
Communication Technology (lCT).
Other issues and challenges include:

regulatory oversight, inadequate
technology and market infrastructure,
inability to mobilize funds in the

reform measures on financial
intermediation in Nigeria. The
analyses

of

various measures of

financial system development

supervision, as well as of information
and the legalsystem, is an important

factor in financial sector
development. Strong regulation and

supervision could encourage

domestic depositors and investors
and attract foreign investors. The
inherently risky nature of banks'
activities has brought to the fore
issues of effective risk management
and makes an adequate risk

showed that though some

management framework imperative.

still lagged behind some of

Finally, it is necessary to stress that
financial reforms are dynamic and
depend on the level of development
of the financialsystem. The challenge
is to ensure that financial sector
reforms impact on the real economy

improvements were made, Nigeria

its
emerging market counterparts. One

possible explanation of this was that
the repression of the financial system
for about two and half decades,
starting from political independence in
1960, till 1986 when the liberalization
policies of the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP), freed the sector

from excessive government
regulation, contributed

to

the

shallowness of the system. Even with
reform, the financial system and the

entire economy operated under
guided deregulation with interest
rates returning to being controlled at
varioustimes in the 1990s.

through efficient policy
implementation. For financial system
reform to be effective and efficient,
some of the identified challenges
need to be addressed, and financial

sector reforms and supervision
require inputs and support from all
stakeholders.

5.1

PolicyRecommendations

ln the light of the foregoing, the paper
recommends that policies directed at

A strong financial system is critical for

removing structural distortions and

and

which hold out the promise of a sound
macro economy be pursued before
the implementation of financial sector

financial intermediation

economic growth and development.

Recent national and global

developments have led to various
financial sector reforms in Nigeria,
with each of these reforms having a
substantial impact on the financial
sector and the overall economy. The
global financial and economic crises
have raised issues concerning
regulation and supervision. The
quality of financial regulation and

Figure

liberalization and reform
programmes. The financial system
needs to be fully liberalized and the
range of services offered needs to be

broadened. This may imply
encouraging greater foreign
participation in the sector.

It is generally recognized that the
continued underdevelopment of the
banking system reflects lack of trust
of the population in banks, of banks in

6

borrowers, of foreign counterparties
in banks and of banks in one another.

Credit to the Private Sector as a Ratio of GDP

As to the lack of trust in banks, the
underlying. reasons are: poor

09

transparency and corporate

0.8

07
06
05

governance in the banking sector, lax
regulation of the banking system and

04

therefore, need to improve the legal

repeated banking crises. There is

03
02

framework

for transparency and
of banks as well as

management

01
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enforcement of compliance with
formal requirements to quality and

procedures for risk management and
control, in line with international best
practices.

gatm 8rl* rI tlllfltr
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The current strengthening of banking
supervision by the CBN in
combination with other planned
measures to stabilize and strengthen
the financial system are steps in the

right direction and should go a long
way in overcoming the fundamental
lack of trust in the system. A failure to

strengthen banking supervision and
regulation would not only hinder the
restoration of trust but cortld further
distort resource allocation, with
potentially serious future costs to the

economy. Extensive training of

auditors and regulators in the near
term is an important step in this
direction.

April - June 2010

financial information for potential
customers, creditors, and portfolio
investors, it would also facilitate more

This paper advocates the speedy
adoption of international financial

reporting standard for all Nigerian
banks (currently in the pipeline). This
reform, while by no means a cure-all
for problems of bank transparency,
would nonetheless be a significant
step forward, if properly implemented.
Apart from benefits of higher quality

effective banking supervision, and
make Nigerian banks more attractive
for acquisition by larger domestic and
foreign banks. There is also the need

to establish more credit bureaus, to
allow for the provision of information
on borrowers'credit history, to address
the problem of adverse selection and

moral hazards, discussed

in

the

literature.
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